In this paper, the physical layer security of a dual-hop underlay uplink cognitive radio network is investigated over Nakagami-m fading channels. Specifically, multiple secondary sources (S i ) 1≤i≤N are taking turns in accessing the licensed spectrum of the primary users and communicating with a multi-antenna secondary base station (D) through the aid of a multi-antenna relay R in the presence of M eavesdroppers (E k ) 1≤k≤M that are also equipped with multiple antennas. Among the remaining nodes, one jammer is randomly selected to transmit an artificial noise to disrupt all the eavesdroppers that are attempting to intercept the communication of the legitimate links i.e., S i -R and R-D. The received signals at each node are combined using maximum-ratio combining. Secrecy analysis is provided by deriving closed-form and asymptotic expressions for the secrecy outage probability. The impact of several key parameters on the system's secrecy e.g., transmit power of the sources, number of eavesdroppers, maximum tolerated interference power, and the number of diversity branches is investigated. Importantly, by considering two scenarios, namely (i) absence and (ii) presence of a friendly jammer, new insights are obtained for the considered communication system. Especially, we tend to answer to the following question: Can better secrecy be achieved without jamming by considering a single antenna at eavesdroppers and multiple-ones at the legitimate users (i.e., relay and end-user) rather than sending permanently an artificial noise and considering that both the relay and the destination are 
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing number of mobile users led to an unprecedented demand for spectral resources.
In this regard, cognitive radio has emerged as a new paradigm that enhances the spectrum efficiency by allowing its reuse [1] . In underlay cognitive radio networks (CRNs), the issue of radio-frequency spectrum scarcity is alleviated by allowing the secondary users (SUs) to share the spectrum with primary users (PUs) under the condition of not causing any harmful interference to them. Consequently, the SUs are required to continuously adjust their transmit powers in order to meet the PUs' quality of service (QoS). Under such constraints, ensuring the physical layer security (PLS) of multi-hop CRNs becomes a challenge of utmost importance.
To remedy this problem, several techniques can be used to strengthen the secrecy capacity at each hop namely increasing the number of diversity branches at the receivers, sending a jamming signal with the highest power, increasing maximum transmit power at the source and maximum tolerated interference power as well, reducing the number of hops, employing zeroforcing precoding techniques, involving energy harvesting (EH) and non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) technique etc.
Recently, the PLS of CRNs has been the focus of many recent research works. For instance, non-cooperative CRNs were considered in [2] - [5] , therein all receivers i.e., both destination and eavesdropper were assumed to be equipped with multiple antennas and perform the selection combining (SC) technique. Particularly, in [2] , the source is also assumed to be a multi-antennas node performing transmit antenna selection, while in [3] the secrecy performance is investigated for both secondary and primary networks. Closed-form and asymptotic expressions for the secrecy outage probability (SOP) were derived under Rayleigh [3] , [4] and Nakagami-m [2] , [5] fading models.
The PLS of multi-relays dual-hop CRNs was explored in [6] - [9] . Specifically, in [6] and [7] , the communication was performed in the presence of only one eavesdropper attempting to overhear the communication channel, while multiple eavesdroppers were considered in [8] and [9] . Furthermore, In [6] , optimal and suboptimal relay selection were analyzed while in [7] the relay that minimizes the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the wiretap link was chosen. Besides, in [8] , the most threatening eavesdropper is selected first according to the maximum SNR of the wiretap links between the source and the eavesdroppers. Next, the best relay minimizing the SNR at the selected eavesdropper is then chosen. In [9] , the relay that maximizes the achievable secrecy rate is selected. Under these conditions, closed-form and asymptotic expressions for the SOP and intercept probability (IP) were derived over either Nakagami-m [6] or Rayleigh [7] - [9] fading channels. The IP and SOP analysis of cooperative underlay EH-based CRNs have been investigated in [10] and [10] - [14] , respectively. Specifically, the SUs have been assumed to harvest energy from the PU's signals in [10] - [12] . In contrast, in [13] - [14] the relay is harvesting energy from the SU signals instead.
The PLS of NOMA-based CRNs has been investigated in [15] - [16] . In [15] , an overlay NOMA CRN was considered such that the SUs were assumed to be eavesdroppers, while the PLS of mmWave NOMA CRN was investigated in [16] . Closed-form expressions for the connection outage probability, SOP and secrecy throughput were derived over Nakagami-m fading channels.
PLS analysis through the aid of a friendly jammer was discussed in [17] - [19] . In [17] , the IP was derived by considering multiple source-destination pairs communicating under eavesdropping attempts of only one eavesdropper, with the source cooperation aided opportunistic jamming.
In [18] , the SOP of dual-hop aided opportunistic jamming CRNs is investigated. In this work, one relay is selected to forward the information while another one is chosen to disrupt the eavesdropper by sending an artificial noise. Also, in the two aforementioned works, several selection policies of the friendly jammer were considered. The impact of the friendly jammer's transmit power in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers by considering a direct communication link between multiple sources and one destination is discussed in [19] .
In this work, we investigate the joint impact of the friendly jammer's transmit power, multiple SUs with power adaptation constraint, number of eavesdroppers, number of diversity branches, maximum tolerated interference power at the PU receiver on the PLS of a cooperative underlay uplink CRNs under Nakagami-m fading model. Without loss of generality, it is worth mentioning that each user is transmitting its data independently from other users. Consequently, the sources are assumed to transmit in turns their data while a friendly jammer is randomly selected among the remaining idle sources to transmit an artificial noise so as to disrupt the eavesdroppers. In this scheme, the nodes R, D, E k perform MRC technique, hence the knowledge of the channel state information (CSI) at these nodes is necessary. For this reason, we assume that the CSI is available. Additionally, eavesdroppers are considered are passive.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• The PLS of an underlay uplink dual-hop CRN operating under Nakagami-m fading environment is investigated by deriving closed-form and asymptotic expressions for the SOP of the overall system under two scenarios namely, (i) presence and (ii) absence of a friendly jammer.
• Under the power adaptation constraint of the SUs, the joint impact of the discussed parameters on the system's security is investigated.
• We show that the system's security is enhanced in the presence of an important number of eavesdroppers by increasing the (i) SUs' transmit powers (ii) number of legitimate destination branches (iii) and maximum tolerated interference power.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system and channel models are presented. Closed-form as well as asymptotic expressions for the SOP are derived in Section III. In Section IV, the numerical and simulation results are provided and discussed for various key parameters' values. Finally, this work is concluded in Section V.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
The considered two-hops CRN, represented in Fig. 1 , consists of multiple sources
equipped with L D antennas, one PU transmitter (P T x ), and one PU receiver (P Rx ). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the relay receives the transmitted signals from S i on the L R antennas and uses only one antenna to forward the message to D. Moreover, we consider multiuser scheduling such that, at any given moment, only one user is transmitting its data. Also, the source nodes are taking rounds in accessing the spectrum and a friendly jammer S J is randomly selected among N − 1 remaining nodes to send an artificial noise. This latter can be canceled by legitimate nodes, while E k cannot mitigate it, leading to an increase in the secrecy capacity.
Similarly to [17] , we assume that a friendly jammer generates an artificial noise using a pseudorandom sequence that is known to the legitimate users which allows them to cancel out this noise, while this sequence remains unknown to the illegitimate ones. To this end, the main aim of this work is to investigate the impact of a friendly jammer, legitimate, and wiretap channels' average SNRs, maximum tolerated interference power as well as the spatial diversity at both the relay and the end-user on the secrecy performance of the considered communication system. In this scheme, Nakagami-m fading model is considered for all links. The fading amplitudes of
h q where q = {S i R, RD t , S i E k , RE k , RP, S i P }. Consequently, the channel gains g q = |h q | 2 are Gamma distributed with probability density function (PDF) and cumulative density function (CDF) are given by
where λ q = m q Ω q , m q and Ω q denote the fading severity and the average channel power gain, 
The received signals at R, E k at both hops, and D are given, respectively, by Here, P n and x n denote the transmit power and signal from the node n, respectively where
vector of the links S i -R, S i -E k , R-D, † denotes the transpose conjugate, and ||.|| represents the Frobenius norm. Also, n R , n D , and n E k , denote the N n × 1 additive white Gaussian noise vector at R, D, and E k , respectively. For the sake of simplicity, all noise power vectors' components are considered equal N 0 .
Throughout the transmission process, both S i , and R have to adapt their transmit powers so as to avoid causing harmful interference to the PUs. Thus, the transmit power of the source and the relay R taking into consideration the maximum constraint power can be, respectively, expressed as
and
where P max S i and P max R denote the maximum transmit power at S i , and R, respectively, while P I accounts for the maximum tolerated interference power at P Rx . 
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this section, we start by defining the secrecy capacities for the two hops' links. Next, we present the SOP analysis in terms of both closed-form and asymptotic expressions for various cases of fading severity parameters, specifically, those of the legitimate and the wiretap links of the first hop. Also, two scenarios will be considered, namely, the presence and absence of a friendly jammer.
A. Secrecy Capacity
The secrecy capacity can be defined as the maximum rate at which the transmitted information can confidentially reach its intended destination. In our considered system, the secrecy capacities in the case of presence and absence of a friendly jammer are given, respectively, by
where
and C
denote the secrecy capacities at the first hop, i.e., the difference between the capacity of the main link S i − R and the one of the wiretap channel S i − E k in the presence and absence of a friendly jammer, respectively, and can be written as
, γ
where γ
(i)
R denotes the instantaneous SNR at R, while γ
and γ
1E stand for the SNRs at the eavesdropper E k in the presence and absence of a friendly jammer, respectively, and are given by
2S is the secrecy capacity of the second hop, representing the difference between the capacity of the link R − D and the one of the wiretap channel
where γ D , and γ
2E denote the instantaneous SNR of the main link R − D and the channel R − E k , respectively and are given as
Remark 1.
• One can see from (14) and (15), that the PHY layer security at the first hop in the presence of a friendly jammer can be enhanced by increasing separately γ I , γ S i , or γ S J . Indeed, the increasing scale of the SNR at the relay exceeds the one of the kth eavesdropper as a jamming signal is added to the one received by E k . However, in the absence of a friendly jammer, one can see from (14) and (16) that only the impact of legitimate and wiretap channels' parameters can make the distinction between the two associated SNRs. Consequently, the smaller λ S i R , the greater the secrecy capacity and then the security gets improved.
• From (18) and (19), it can be noticed that increasing either γ R or γ I enhances more the capacity of the legitimate link as D performs the MRC technique. Additionally, increasing the number of antennas at the receiver increases the SNR at D. Consequently, the system's security gets enhanced as well.
B. Exact Secrecy Outage Probability
In this paper, the SOP is chosen as a performance metric and it accounts for the probability that the secrecy capacity is less than a predefined secrecy rate R s . For the considered system, the N sources are taking rounds in accessing the spectrum then one jammer is randomly selected among the N − 1 remaining sources. The SOP if there were no jamming, can be expressed as
while in the presence of a jammer, it becomes [17]
where SOP (i) and SOP (i,J) account for SOP of the system linking S i with D in the presence of eavesdroppers, and in the absence and presence of the Jth friendly jammer, respectively. The SOP of the considered system stands for the probability that at least one of the secrecy capacities falls below a predefined secrecy rate R s , namely
and SOP
stand for the secrecy capacities at the first hop in the presence and absence of a friendly jammer, respectively, and SOP
represents the secrecy capacity at the second hop. One can see from (22) and (23) that the computation of SOP requires the knowledge of SOP
, and SOP
as well.
are between 0 and 1, it is worth mentioning that the greater is M , the greater is SOP (approaches 1), and then the system becomes vulnerable to eavesdropping attack.
under Nakagamim fading model are given by (24), (25), and (26), respectively, as shown at the top of the next page, where
where Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
C. Asymptotic Secrecy Outage Probability
In this subsection, we provide an asymptotic analysis of the derived closed-form expressions of the SOP. The expressions given in (24), (25), and (26) can be approximated for SNR regime by considering γ P → ∞.
Theorem 2. The Asymptotic expression of the SOP in the absence of a jammer is given by (50) as shown in the next page, while it is expressed in the presence of a jamming signal depending on various cases as follows
are defined in (51), (52), and (53)-(55), respectively.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix B.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we validate the derived analytical results through Monte Carlo simulation by generating 10 6 Gamma-distributed random variables. The setting parameters of the simulation
are summarized in Table 1 . Indeed, the values of fading severity parameter m • have been chosen such that the wiretap channel is better than the legitimate one. Moreover, their values are taken integer in the range 2..5 similarly to [6] and [20] . On the other hand, the average SNR, which is inversely proportional to λ • , the legitimate link is considered better than the one of the (8) and (9) that above that threshold, both sources and relay will always transmit with their maximum powers. Consequently, the legitimate and wiretap capacities of each hop 
aim here is to investigate if the security gets enhanced when having artificial noise and legitimate nodes with a single antenna or the scenario of the absence of jammer and all legitimate nodes are equipped with multiple antennas. One can obviously notice that the system's security is improved when diversity is used at the legitimate nodes. Additionally, in the presence of an important number of eavesdroppers, the friendly jammer does not contribute to the enhancement of the system's security.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the physical layer security of a dual-hop underlay uplink CRN operating under Nakagami-m fading channels was investigated. We considered multiple sources communicating, 
derived by considering two scenarios namely, (i) presence and (ii) absence of a friendly jammer.
The obtained results showed that the best secrecy is achieved in the presence of a small number of eavesdroppers when increasing the transmit power of the SUs', the number of antennas at the legitimate receiver and the maximum tolerated interference power at the PU as well.
Interestingly, we showed that equipping the legitimate nodes by multiple antennas leads to a noticeable enhancement of the system's security rather than sending an artificial noise. As future work, we intend to investigate the impact of NOMA jointly with the key parameters considered in this work on the system's secrecy. We also intend to consider the case of amplify-and-forward 
A. Expression of SOP at the First Hop
The SOP at the first hop in the absence and presence of a friendly jammer is given, respectively, by 
where (57) and (56) 
and γ is being defined in Theorem 1.
• Conditional CDF of γ
R for a given g S i P can be expressed as
, 1E can be expressed as 19 where
It is worth mentioning that for i.i.d Nakagami-m channels, E S i R and E S i E k are Gamma distributed with shape and scale parameters L R m S i R and
Substituting (60) and (61) 
l is defined in (35). Now, replacing (62) into (56), one can obtain
where step (a) is obtained by replacing Φ (x) by its values, and performing some algebraic manipulations.
Now, incorporating (64) into (63), (25) is attained.
2) SOP at the First Hop in the Presence of a Jamming Signal: In the presence of a friendly jammer, the CDF of γ
for a given g S i P is given by
. Here step (65a) holds using the definition (15), while step (65b) is obtained by using integration by parts alongside the Binomial formula for a positive integer
Importantly, the derivation of the CDF of γ
requires the one of W
.
where j = √ −1, L 1 is a vertical line of integration chosen such as to separate the left poles of the above integrand function from the right ones, ∆ (J)
are defined in Theorem 1 and (34), respectively.
Step (a)
holds using [24, Eq. (06.06.26.0004.01)] alongside with (1) and (2). As mentioned above,
Substituting (67) into (66), we get
Now, it remains to compute V (h) (y) so as to evaluate (65b). Using (68), yields
with On the other hand, the term T (h) 2 can be expressed as
is being defined in Theorem 1.
Finally, the conditional CDF of γ
can be expressed by substituting (70) and (71) into (69) and then replacing it into (65b), yields
Now, the remaining last previous step in this proof consists of computing Ξ
by differentiating (60) and using (1) alongside with (72), (58) can be rewritten for a positive
, and Υ
(i)
l are defined in (30), (32), (33), (35), respectively, and
The two above terms can be expressed as
where Henceforth, substituting (75) and (76) into (73), yields
Now, replacing (77) into (57), we obtain
where By substituting (79) and (80) into (78), (24) is attained.
B. Expression of SOP at the Second Hop
In like manner to SOP
can be expressed as
with
One can notice from (82) that in order to calculate SOP (k) 2 , it is necessary to find first the conditional CDFs of γ D and γ (k) 2E for a given g RP .
• Conditional CDFs of γ D and γ
In a similar manner to (60), the conditional CDFs of γ D and γ (k) 2E are given, respectively, by
It follows, in a similar manner to E S i R , that E RE k is also Gamma distributed with parameters
It is worthwhile that Y RD is Gamma distributed for i.i.d Nakagami-m random variables with shape and scale parameters L D m RD and λ RD , respectively. That is
where B j is defined in (36). Note that step (a) holds by substituting (83) and (84) Substituting (85) into (81), yields
where In this section, we make use of the residues theorem in order to find the approximate expressions of Meijer-G's function given in (24) . (z) given in (24) can be expressed in terms of complex integral as
It is noteworthy that the conditions of [22, Theorem 1.5] are satisfied. That is, the two above functions can be written as an infinite sum of the poles belonging to the left half plan of L 3 .
Furthermore, as the upper incomplete gamma function in (89) is always finite for ϕ J = 0, it follows that the integrand functions of the two above equations have the same poles. Additionally, it is clearly seen that the order of the left poles depends on the values of
h, and l. Owing to this fact, three cases can be distinguished:
In this case, the two integrand functions given in (88) and (89) 
as simple poles and − r with r = L E k m S J E k + r and r natural number as poles of second-order.
•
Under this condition, the aforementioned integrands
where r ∈ N as poles of second-order.
Under this assumption, the two integrands admit only poles of second-order at − r , r ∈ N.
(z) can be rewritten as series of residues at the aforementioned poles
In similar manner, M (h,l) 2 (z) can be expressed as
the second summation in the two above expressions can be ignored as z approaches 0, i.e.,
Analogously to the previous case, the integrals (88) and (89) 
One can notice that as r < χ h,l,r , M
(z) can be approximated when z
and (z) can be approximated as z approaches 0 by
Finally, the Meijer's G-function M 3 (z) defined in (31) can be written in terms of complex integral as
It is worth mentioning that the conditions of [22] are applied also here. Thus, the above integrand function can be written as an infinite sum of the left poles in L 4 . Besides, that integrand admits only poles of the first order at 0 and −L R m S i R − r, r ∈ N. That is 
Interestingly, the SOP (i,k,J) 1
can finally be approximated in high SNR regime (i.e., γ I → ∞) by considering three cases, namely
Substituting (97), (98), (109), and (110) into (24), and by considering h = L E k m S i E k −1,
can be approximated as
is given in (53).
Incorporating (102), (103), (109), and (110) into (24) , and by considering l = L R m S i R −1,
is given in (54).
Replacing ( can be approximated as
is given in (55). 
as z tends to 0. By considering only the two cases i.e., l = L R m S i R − 1 and l = L R m S i R − 2 and performing some algebraic manipulations, one can obtain given in (25) and (26), respectively have the same shape, one can see that
Finally, replacing (111), (112), (113), and (116) into (22) , one can get the expressions (37)-(40), respectively. Furthermore, substituting (115) and (116) into (23), (50) is attained which concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
